BLOG

Today marks the unceremonious end of the Afghanistan Compact, an agreement by over 60 world leaders and President Karzai to establish Afghanistan's five-year development objectives. Sound familiar? It should. Just one year ago at the London Conference, world leaders were hailing the Afghan government's unveiling of its "new" peace and development framework. Will donor governments again lose sight, leaving the agreements made in the London Conference of 2010 forgotten?

The Afghanistan Compact set out clear and measurable benchmarks to reduce poverty and strengthen security, governance and rule of law. Some have been met, laudably, considering the obstacles of the escalating conflict, but major concerns remain. For example, while the numbers of Afghan police and army have exceeded the goals in the Afghanistan Compact, attrition rates from attacks and desertions continue to rise.

Security rightly remains the top concern of both the Afghan people and the international community. Yet, as the Afghanistan Compact laid out a pledge to disband illegal armed groups and the United Nations made some progress, new programs led by the Afghan government and U.S. Special Forces threaten to negate such fragile gains by training and arming locals with little oversight and accountability. Already, reports of local militias' abuse and extortion of civilians and their collaboration with insurgent groups are coming to light.

On socio-economic indicators, progress lags far behind the promises set out in the Afghanistan Compact. While the Afghan and donor governments promised to reduce poverty by 3 percent and hunger by 5 percent each year, nearly half the country remains mired in poverty and the number of Afghans who do not have enough food to eat has increased. Low snowfall this winter brings the threat of drought and food prices are projected to continue to rise this year.

The rights of women and girls were also prioritized with pledges to enroll 60% of girls in primary school and the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA). Today, progress in girls' education has only reached the halfway point, with an estimated 42% of girls in school. The Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA), which was tasked with leading the implementation of NAPWA across relevant ministries, is still weak — so weak that the U.S. State Department's 2010 assistance to MOWA was focused on the “bare bones,” such as desks and stationery for the minister's office.

Afghanistan's problems present formidable challenges. Yet it is clear that since 2002, donor governments have repeatedly lost focus or changed goals, to the frustration of and detriment to the Afghan people. Now, as the U.S. and other troop-contributing countries push through their exit strategy, and transition security and basic services to the Afghan government, they must ensure they are not simply recreating a flat tire. Instead, they must do all they can to help Afghanistan develop the capacity and resources to protect and serve Afghans

Download the agreement Afghanistan Compact (external site).