BLOG

As we approach the historic referendum on the independence of south Sudan, scheduled to begin Sunday, much has been written and said about the volatility of the political process leading up to the referendum. A less well-known story is how southern Sudanese living in Khartoum have begun returning back to the south in waves, while humanitarian workers in south Sudan struggle to respond to the increasing need.

These new arrivals place huge strains on minimal community resources and infrastructure as Refugees International found on a mission in November. Many returnees have sold or left behind their household possessions in the north, and have few resources at hand when they reach the south. As the international humanitarian community, initially caught somewhat off guard by the movements, works to establish policies and guidelines to manage the ongoing response, the unique circumstances of these people must be taken into consideration. This will require adjusting traditional humanitarian response strategies.

The first adjustment needed is a matter of ideology. As people began to return south, humanitarian actors in Sudan were wary of providing assistance to a process that they saw as “politically motivated” and linked to influencing the results of the referendum. To be fair, the Government of Southern Sudan initially encouraged southerners to return home through a “Come Home to Choose” program, which emphasized links to the ongoing political process. However, the deadline to register for the referendum has now passed and waves of people continue to arrive, many citing fear for their safety and protection if they remain in the north. People are fleeing their homes based on legitimate fears, which have been fueled by comments from some NCP officials questioning southerners’ rights to continue living in the north if the south secedes.  It is therefore clear that agencies can not make a blanket assumption that people are returning to influence the referendum. More importantly, the humanitarian community should not reduce assistance to people returning home based on this argument.

The second adjustment is about response strategy. Typically in return movements, humanitarian assistance is provided at the returnees’ final destination point -- or their “point of origin” from which they initially fled. This avoids the establishment of settlements in transit areas that can persist for months or years. However, many southern Sudanese from the north have never actually lived in the south. They may have ethnic ties to a particular southern village, but have never been there. They have also never lived in a rural environment, having grown up in Khartoum. In some cases, they may face language barriers. Despite the fact that they have no intention of returning to this village, agencies officially assume they will be returning to their “point of origin.” Others who do return to their villages may ultimately migrate back to urban areas when they find there are no services or support in the rural areas.

If the humanitarian community ignores this dynamic and provides only minimal assistance to these people, transit camps and squatter settlements will continue to form anyway.  Immediate support for urban integration and income-generating activities, as well as targeting assistance wherever the greatest objective need is identified, are key.

The humanitarian community must also recognize the changing profile of returnees. Many southerners that paid for their transportation to return home soon after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005 were considered “well off”. However, today returnees are selling their property and purging their savings in order to afford the cost of transportation back home. They are in critical need of basic assistance and supplies in order to reestablish themselves. Likewise, female-headed households, unaccompanied children, the elderly, and disabled will need more specialized support.

At the same time, much of the responsibility for smooth return movements lies with the Government of Southern Sudan. The wave of returns that began in October was largely funded by governors of individual states and not coordinated with the larger humanitarian community. As a result, international humanitarian actors were not prepared to respond to the humanitarian needs of returnees arriving thousands at a time. In addition to ensuring that the human rights of returnees are upheld and that they are transported voluntarily, safely, and with dignity, the southern Sudanese government must ensure that all government-sponsored returns are coordinated with humanitarian agencies. The government should also ensure that returnees, especially those from Khartoum and other more urban environments, are informed about the conditions in the south and the services that will be available to them.

Ultimately, an effective humanitarian response must reflect the unique circumstances in Sudan, rather than a “one-size-fits-all” strategy. As south Sudan seems increasingly likely to vote for secession from the north starting on Sunday, providing southerners with the means to peacefully rebuild their lives and communities should be the international community’s first priority.