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U.S. Engagement in Sudan: Easier Said than Done

As we move closer to the January 2011 referendum on southern Sudanese independence and a laundry list of unresolved issues remains between the two parties, criticism of U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration is reaching fever pitch. It is hard to go more than a couple of days without reading an article, paper or blog somewhere in the U.S. complaining about his perceived shortcomings and suggesting that solutions would be just around the corner, if only the Obama Administration could get its act together. In the past few months there have been many suggestions, from shooting down Sudanese aircraft, to blockading Port Sudan to prevent oil revenues benefiting the Khartoum government. There has been call after call for General Gration to stop being “naïve,” to resign, to be supervised more closely by President Obama and Secretary Clinton. The accusation that Gration is soft on the Khartoum government is blamed for the lack of progress in both the Darfur and the north-south peace processes.

Many articles and papers circulating express dismay at Gration’s policies but do not go nearly as far as those mentioned above, which is in a way, even worse. Many make vague references to getting tough, standing up for this, not putting up with that. But what does it all mean? Does Gration have a trick up his sleeve that he simply hasn’t pulled out yet, one that would totally change the dynamics of the game? After years of a tough approach by the Bush Administration that was ultimately not a game-changer, the U.S. seems to have arrived at its current approach by virtue of not having too many options left.

This is not to say the U.S. is weak. The U.S. has a lot of potential influence, but its strength lies far more in what it can offer than what it can threaten. The emotional and personal attacks from all sides that have come to characterize this debate are preventing a rational, balanced discussion of the pros and cons and what leverage we really have – including tightening the sanctions regime, loosening it, offering normalization of relations and so on.

In all of the rhetoric, the obvious question left unanswered is: what realistically is the alternative to Gration’s approach of persuasion and engagement? Does the U.S. want to get in a shooting war over the skies of Sudan, further deepening the impression in some parts of the world that America has an anti-Islam agenda? Does the U.S. have the stomach for a showdown with China over a naval blockade? Could the U.S. count on the support of its European allies in any of this? My hunch is that the answer to all of these questions is “no.”

Refugees International has so far not taken a firm position for or against Gration. Although Gration is sometimes his own worst enemy – with statements such as the now-famous “cookies and gold stars” comment fanning the flames – for us, it is not about him as an individual. We welcomed the Administration’s new Sudan strategy last fall even though we sometimes disagree with various policies adopted. When we disagree, we say so. At the same time, we are not convinced that weakening Gration without any other coherent, realistic strategy for Sudan is the right approach, especially now at such a critical time, with a little over six months left before the referendum. It is very unlikely that President Obama or Secretary Clinton would have anywhere near the time to devote to Sudan that Gration currently does. It is also about accountability. When the parties fail to make progress on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, somehow we in the policy and activist community seem to have concluded that it is not the parties’ fault but Gration’s.

Engagement is not the same thing as concession but it is also not a path to instant victory. We cannot expect immediate capitulation by the Government of Sudan simply because the U.S. has reluctantly agreed to “engage,” having tried most everything else. Engagement will be a long and difficult struggle wherein we will win some and lose some. We must just ensure that we “win” on the most important issues, such as ensuring that a free, fair and credible referendum is held on schedule, and that at the end of the day Sudan is a more stable place than when we started.