09/19/2007

Contacts: Melanie Teff & Mark Malan

A Refugees International team recently evaluated humanitarian conditions for returnees and efforts towards security sector reform in Liberia. While the new government, with the support of the United Nations and donor governments, has made some progress, the transition to peace and stability is fragile. Given Liberia’s importance to the regional stability of West Africa, the US should lead efforts to cancel Liberia’s debt, provide sustained humanitarian funding, and offer more effective support for security sector reform. The UN must also ensure that all displaced people can establish permanent homes and livelihoods.

1. Meeting Humanitarian Needs

There are still major unmet humanitarian needs in Liberia, particularly in health, education, food security, and water and sanitation. However, the Liberian government has to talk development - not emergency assistance - to meet the World Bank’s criteria for debt cancellation, without which Liberia will be unable to qualify for loans for large-scale infrastructure development. Most of the country’s few roads are impassable in the rainy season, and major infrastructure projects are a prerequisite for recovery and any real economic progress. Development is essential for the country, but development will be unsustainable if the immediate humanitarian needs are not also met. The UN and non-governmental organizations provide almost all basic services in health and education, but their assistance is declining. Malnutrition is high and half of Liberian children are not in school. The 2007 Liberia Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) has received only 39% of its funding. WFP has received a paltry 21% of its funding needs and will soon have to cut back its emergency school-feeding program if further funding is not obtained. Relief agencies and NGOs with a mandate to work in emergencies are moving out.

Read key facts on humanitarian needs in Liberia.

2. Policing in Poor Neighborhoods

Since 2004, UN Police officers (UNPOL) have assisted the Liberian National Police (LNP) in trying to maintain law and order, at the same time as they were mandated to restructure, retrain and re-equip the police service. The UN Mission in Liberia had no money to fulfill its mandate to rebuild the police, so they vetted and recruited a few hundred new police officers from the dismantled LNP to work alongside them. Meanwhile, the United States provided $500,000 for training 3,500 new officers at the Liberian National Police Academy. 3,522 officers have graduated from the Academy and are being deployed country-wide. But the LNP remains ineffective, largely because of critical shortages of essential police equipment – from vehicles and radios to handcuffs and raincoats (it rains 50% of the time in the country). Donors have provided assistance to the LNP in dribs and drabs, and invariably very late. Improving funding and addressing urgent leadership and management challenges will improve the present low morale and poor discipline of the LNP.

3. Access to Justice

The people of Liberia have very limited access to justice. The judicial system is constrained by limited infrastructure, shortage of qualified personnel, lack of capacity to process cases, poor management and lack of the necessary will to institute reforms. As a result of these shortcomings, many Liberians have little confidence in the justice system. In particular, women’s groups report that the Rape Amendment Act 2006 is having little impact, largely due to the ineffectiveness of the justice system. Justice sector reform needs to include reform of the prison service, without which there is little point in resolving the other problems of the criminal justice system.

Read key facts about the rule of law in Liberia.

4. Improving Defense in an Armed and Dangerous Neighborhood

Liberia has no army. What remained as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was effectively a force constituted of loyalists to deposed President Charles Taylor. The US pledged $210 million to the task of creating an effective 2000-strong Liberian army, contracting DynCorp and PAE to help dissolve the old army and recruit and train a new force. While the DynCorp-led recruiting, vetting and training process is ongoing, only 5% of this new army has completed a short basic training course. They are not yet integrated in units under effective command. Weak and erratic funding from the US Department of State is the main cause of the slow pace of AFL development. Extant US funding is sufficient to train only 1,200 more recruits, which means that the 2nd battalion cannot be formed. In a region “awash with small arms” there is a constant need for effective patrolling to deter the cross-border movement of weapons and recruitment of mercenaries. The 14,000-strong UN force should not be reduced below the 9,000 benchmark until the AFL is operational.

Read key facts on the Armed Forces of Liberia.

5. Establishing Permanent Homes and Livelihoods

The official return program for refugees and internally displaced persons ended on June 30, 2007. But there are 75,000 Liberians still living in neighboring countries of refuge, most of whom want to remain. There are also many displaced inside Liberia who missed out on the returns process and who remain in former IDP camps on the outskirts of Monrovia and elsewhere, some of whom still want to go home. There are unknown numbers of people squatting in abandoned public buildings in Monrovia, many of them internally displaced. All these “unsettled” people have one thing in common: they have or see no chance of making a living in the places they came from. In Monrovia, the swollen urban army of the unemployed (the rate for Liberia is around 85%) contribute to a widespread feeling of insecurity, especially among women and girls. Sexual assault, rape and armed robbery are on the rise, and the police are ill-equipped to respond.

Read key facts about returns in Liberia.

6. Bringing Skilled Workers Home

Years of conflict and displacement have resulted in a deficit of Liberians with sufficient qualifications and skills to govern, deliver services and manage those services. The war badly disrupted schooling and higher education for over 15 years. Educated and skilled Liberians were among the first to flee the violence, and very few have returned. There are now thousands of Liberian professionals living and working abroad, people with knowledge and skills that could make a huge contribution to Liberia’s development. However, they are unlikely to return to the country until they are convinced that it is safe and secure, that the rule of law prevails, and that there are business and employment opportunities to return to.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Donor governments fully support humanitarian appeals for Liberia, including the 2007 CHAP and WFP appeal.
2. The UN Security Council endorse the adjustment and drawdown plan outlined in the Secretary-General’s August progress report on UNMIL.
3. The US support the build-up of a credible police service in Liberia in cooperation with local and international partners. The US should also establish a multi-donor funding mechanism to develop rule of law in Liberia, with an emphasis on the justice sector and corrections services.
4. The US State Department request, and Congress support, a 2008 supplemental budget equal to that granted in July 2007 for the Liberia Security Sector Reform Program.
5. UNHCR and the Liberian government survey Liberians who are displaced within the country, and identify places for them to establish permanent homes and livelihoods.
6. The US fund the UN Development Program’s efforts to bolster government ministries with expatriate Liberian professionals to encourage skilled Liberians to return home.