12/14/2007

• The process of integrating the various fighting forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, known as brassage, was seen as a necessary precondition for the organization of the 2006 elections. The idea was to dissipate the capacity of former combatant leaders to veto by means of force an unfavorable electoral outcome, while also providing integrated army units to stabilize the east of the country.


• Brassage was conceived as an emergency plan, rather than a strategically- planned process of defense sector reform. It required all armed forces to assemble at regrouping centers under the authority of the Chief of General Staff, where they would be separated into those eligible and those ineligible to become members of the Congolese national army, the FARDC. Centers for brassage and re-training (CBRs) were established at six locations around the country, where former combatants were registered and issued an ID card: green for those considered eligible for service in the military; red for those not meeting the requirements for FARDC employment (the old, the seriously ill, the disabled, children under 18 years old, and those otherwise considered physically unfit for the rigors of military service).


• In practice, many who were well below par by military standards were enlisted in the FARDC. The resultant army is bloated, with a total estimated strength of 164,000 personnel (30,000 of them reputed to be "ghosts") on the payroll. The military hierarchy is badly skewed; about 33% of the FARDC are officers; 44% are warrant officers and non-commissioned officers; and only 30% are privates.


• Belgium, Angola, South Africa, the Netherlands, and the European Union provided training support. Eighteen standard infantry brigades of 4,200 troops were to be formed and trained at the CBRs. Fifteen under-strength brigades were ultimately formed. There was little professional military organizational structuring; individuals were grouped together and "topped up" with new arrivals until brigade strength was more or less reached, at which time the whole group entered a 45-day basic training program, upon completion of which the group became a numbered "Integrated Brigade" and deployed operationally. A cohesive, operationally proficient and combat effective brigade cannot be formed in 45 days.


• The army 'integration' process is far from complete. There is no system in place for validating the total number of personnel serving in the FARDC. There is to date no centralized personnel database. In addition to serving members of the FARDC, another 80-90,000 individuals are still awaiting registration and brassage. The mixage process had very perverse consequences, with renegade General Laurent Nkunda consolidating his position in North Kivu and remaining the most serious and salient threat to peace and security in the DRC.


• The brassage and mixage processes did nothing to address the issue of impunity for war crimes and gross human rights violations. There was no screening or vetting process, and several suspected war criminals have been promoted to colonels and generals in a process supported by the international community.


• Giving all combatants the opportunity to assimilate into a new army has inflated retirement benefit costs downstream and created huge problems for any future right-sizing exercise. There are some 30,000 members of the extant FARDC who have reached 60 years of age and are due for retirement, but the state cannot afford to retire them (at an estimated cost of $80 million for severance benefits).