Ken Bacon, RI President
10/10/2001

Testimony by
Kenneth H. Bacon,
President,
Refugees International

To the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

At the outset, I want to thank Senator Paul Wellstone, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, for organizing this hearing on Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis. This hearing could not be more timely, because it comes as the U.S. is attacking terrorists and their protectors in Afghanistan, while moving to feed the Afghan people, a campaign of bombs and bread.

Afghanistan was one of the largest crises of displacement in the world well before the events of September 11, 2001. After more than 20 years of conflict, three years of drought, and the repressive policies of the Taliban regime, four million Afghans had sought refuge in neighboring countries, with as many as two million each in Pakistan and Iran. Inside the country some 800,000 people were displaced. The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) was providing daily rations to 3.8 million people and were preparing to increase the number fed to a total of 5.5 million through the long winter season. The United States was the leading funder of relief efforts for the Afghan people, providing $183 million in FY2001.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, it became clear that the initial focus of U.S. military retaliation would be in Afghanistan. Refugees International, joined by other humanitarian non-governmental organizations, immediately began pressing the Administration to recognize two imperatives: 1) the humanitarian imperative to continue to respond to the needs of the millions of vulnerable Afghan civilians who bear no responsibility whatsoever for the attacks on U.S. soil, and 2) the political imperative of ensuring that the U.S. military response did not harm innocent civilians and thereby jeopardize the moral high ground that the United States has been able to maintain as the victim of terrorism that targeted civilians in New York and Washington. We raised these points in a letter to President Bush and in subsequent meetings with administration and congressional officials. I have attached a copy of the letter to this testimony.

RI applauds the administration’s decision to allocate $320 million to respond to humanitarian needs in Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in neighboring countries. We are especially glad that this pledge comes from the extraordinary $40 billion emergency fund approved by Congress and does not, therefore, reduce U.S. funding for other humanitarian crises around the world. The amount allocated by the Administration represents more than a fair share of the $584 million requested by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his appeal to the international community for Afghan relief.

Nonetheless, given the magnitude of the needs in Afghanistan and the likelihood that reconstruction assistance will be badly needed in the aftermath of the U.S. military campaign, it is probably best to view the $320 million as an initial investment in a lengthy and costly response to the needs of the Afghan people for peace, reconstruction, and development.

The most critical need at the moment is for significant food deliveries to Afghanistan to resume over land. As I have already noted, WFP had planned to provide daily rations to 5.5 million people in the coming months. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, WFP evacuated their expatriate staff and suspended food deliveries. Their extensive network of local staff, however, was able to maintain feeding programs using existing stocks. Last week they delivered 5,000 metric tons of additional food to Afghanistan, but the weekly requirement is about 12,000 tons. The WFP briefly suspended food shipments after military strikes began, but yesterday it announced that it was resuming overland food shipments through Iran.

Refugees International recommends a strategy of flooding the country with food by the most efficient and effective means available. Cross-border shipping by truck from Pakistan, Iran, and the former Soviet republics in the north offers the best possibility to transport the maximum amount of food to areas with concentrations of vulnerable people. This effort needs to begin at once, as winter weather, especially in the north, will impair road transport.

Airdrops of food are inefficient and expensive, but they are better than nothing. They should only be used as a last resort. Refugees International is concerned that the airdrops of individual emergency food packets organized by the U.S. military at the outset of the bombing campaign appear to be intended more to send a political message to the Afghan people and to the Muslim world than to reach large numbers of people at risk of starvation. The focus of the Administration should be to apply as much of the $320 million as possible to getting food into Afghanistan by overland routes through WFP and non-governmental organizations.

Food deliveries inside Afghanistan will save lives and could also help prevent a refugee crisis on the borders of Pakistan, Iran, and other neighboring states. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that as many as 1.5 million people could seek refuge in neighboring states as a result of anti-terrorist military actions and hunger. A refugee outpouring of this magnitude would not only be a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions, it would potentially be politically destabilizing, especially in Pakistan and Iran, where resentment against Afghan refugees was already growing well before the events of September 11.

In this context, the preference is clearly to enable Afghans to remain in their homes and on their farms rather than to have them embark on a long, difficult, and dangerous journey to neighboring countries in search of food.

In the event that large numbers of Afghans decide to seek asylum in neighboring countries, the issue of whether the borders will be open immediately arises. Both Pakistan and Iran insist that their borders remain closed to new Afghan refugees. Both countries prefer that the needs of the displaced be met through cross-border operations to Afghans held in camps inside Afghanistan. Iran is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention that obligates it to provide asylum to vulnerable people fleeing persecution, violence, and hunger. The UNHCR and the international community must insist that neighboring countries open their borders to Afghan refugees, with the understanding that under the principle of "burden sharing" receiving nations would receive appropriate financial assistance from the international community for their decision to honor their obligations.

Refugees International is concerned that UNHCR’s public comments on the issue of opening the borders to refugees at the recent Forum on Afghanistan Refugees and Displaced Persons (held in Geneva on October 5-6) appear designed to meet the governments of Pakistan and Iran halfway rather than taking a principled position on the right to asylum. Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner, has spoken of the possibility of establishing camps inside Afghanistan and of opening borders not for all refugees seeking protection but to assist and protect the vulnerable "temporarily." While this approach is presumably designed to advance delicate negotiations with the governments of Pakistan and Iran, the Afghan people depend on UNHCR to support their right to asylum at this difficult moment. RI urges the administration to insist that the borders of neighboring countries be open to refugees. The U.S. should also intervene with the High Commissioner to ensure that he is vigorously supporting the right to asylum for Afghans.

The crisis in Afghanistan is complex. The U.S. response involves military, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian elements. A lesson that clearly emerges from similar crises over the past decade is the importance of designating a Cabinet-level official specifically and solely to take charge of humanitarian issues. While all senior members of the U.S. team should be sensitive to humanitarian concerns, it is important to have one individual at the table who is responsible for the complex interplay among military, political, and humanitarian aspects of the operation. Recently, President Bush appointed coordinators for homeland defense and counter-terrorism programs.

The over-riding brief for such a humanitarian affairs coordinator should be to ensure that the interests of the Afghan civilians and refugees are protected. The humanitarian affairs coordinator can be either a military or civilian officer. This person could also be the senior contact point for the UN, other international organizations, and NGOs involved on the humanitarian front. What is essential is that the coordinator be in the inner circle of those who are managing the U.S. part of the decision-making process. To do less will court humanitarian errors that will affect the lives of many and the overall credibility of the U.S. government.

In conclusion, let me summarize my three main points:

• The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan predates the September 11th attack against the United States and the U.S. military response to that attack.
• The international community, led by the U.S., has responded well and quickly to the humanitarian needs of the Afghan people.
• Nevertheless, more needs to be done to meet the Afghan people’s needs for food, shelter and medical supplies, and after the current crisis is over, the international community will face the challenge of helping to rebuild Afghanistan.

Refugees are a sign of instability. Frequently, refugees flee a country where the government does not work or fails to protect its own people. The immediate challenge is to meet the humanitarian needs of millions of Afghans, both those inside the country and those in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. After the current crisis, the U.S. and its allies will face a longer term task of helping Afghanistan to become stable and prosperous.