08/10/2004

As of the end of July, the Government of Sudan had still done nothing to rein in the armed Arab militias (the “Janjaweed”) who have been terrorizing the people of Darfur since the spring of 2003. The lack of effective action by Khartoum breaks the commitments it made to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan during his visit to Sudan in early July, commitments formalized in the joint communiqué that it subsequently signed on July 3. After the secretary-General’s visit, the Sudanese military has continued to assist the Janjaweed in launching attacks against African villagers, attacks that have claimed hundreds of lives and displaced thousands more.

The following are among the numerous such attacks that Refugees International learned of during its three-week mission to Sudan from July 10 to July 30:

• An attack by more than 400 armed horsemen on the village of Donki Dereisa on July 12. The attack, which was supported by a fixed-wing aircraft that bombed the village and by several military vehicles filled with Sudanese foot soldiers, resulted in the death of as many as 150 villagers, including six young children --- ages three to fourteen --- who were captured during the assault and burned alive later that day. A man who tried to save them was beheaded and dismembered.
• An attack by the Janjaweed on the village of Talha on approximately July 12. The attack, which left at least 20 dead, including several children, was supported by a military airplane.
• An assault by hundreds of armed horsemen on the village of Tabaldiat on approximately July 13. The raiders killed some 80 civilians and burned the village to the ground.
• An attack on approximately July 13 on the village of Abu Noura by hundreds of Janjaweed, who were supported by a fixed wing aircraft and two military vehicles. Approximately twelve men were killed in the attack and the village was looted and burned.
• Two attacks by the Janjaweed on the village of Ghanja. The first attack took place on July 1 and was launched by a group of 400 horsemen, accompanied by a fixed wing aircraft, a helicopter and several military vehicles. Eight men were killed during the assault, 17 were injured and hundreds of cows, goats and sheep were stolen. The second attack, which was conducted by approximately 200 mounted fighters, took place three weeks later on approximately July 19. This time, the Janjaweed, who were escorted by four land cruisers filled with Sudanese soldiers, killed five villagers and wounded three others.
• An attack on the outskirts of the village of Janjawannah on approximately July 7. The attack was conducted by approximately 20 Janajaweed fighters, who killed three men and stole all of their livestock.
• An attack by scores of Janjaweed on the village of Moraia Jenge in mid-July. They came on horse and camelback and were accompanied by Sudanese soldiers who rode in vehicles with machine gun mounts. The village was looted and a woman was shot in the thigh.
• An attack by dozens of armed horsemen and camel riders on the village of Mosabikra in mid-July. The attackers, who were likewise accompanied by military vehicles filled with Sudanese soldiers, stole livestock and personal belongings and shot one of the villagers in cold blood.

In addition to these attacks, also heard reports of Janjaweed assaults on the villages of Abuhambrah, Kayola, Amakasarah, Sarmah and Kirikos-- all of which took place during the first three weeks of July.  The attacks documented by all occurred in South Darfur.  In Darfur’s other two states, the Government’s terror campaign has been so thorough that there are few villages left to attack.  The African Union has, however, documented at least one chilling incident in West Darfur that took place on July 3, when several civilians were burned alive, following an attack by Janajaweed militia on the village of Suleia.

Given the Government’s continuing participation in the violence, it is hardly surprising that it has done nothing to disarm the Janjaweed as it promised to do when it signed the joint communiqué.  Moreover, while Khartoum claims to have taken steps to bring those who have been committing the atrocities to justice, the reality is very different.  For example, the Government has touted the recent prosecution and sentencing of 17 Janjaweed militiamen in Nyala on charges of robbery and murder.  According to reliable sources inside the Government, however, these “Janjaweed” were, in fact, common criminals plucked from a local jail, who were informed that they would be sentenced to death unless they agreed to pose as Janjaweed and confess to their crimes.

Honoring a commitment in the joint communiqué, the Sudanese Government has allowed a small contingent of 300 unarmed observers from the African Union (AU) into Darfur to monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, as well as any continuing violence against civilians.  Of the 300 observers, however, only 50 had been deployed as of the end of July and they lacked the transport and logistical capacity necessary to carry out their mission.  Furthermore, under the agreement governing their deployment, the AU observers must have representatives from all sides present when investigating alleged violations.  This requirement severely undermines the AU’s effectiveness in monitoring human rights abuses, as victims are understandably reluctant to tell their stories in the presence of Sudanese government officials.  Moreover, Khartoum has been extremely reluctant to allow experienced human rights monitors into Darfur and has only recently given the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights permission to send a small team of monitors into the region.            

Ironically, at the same time that it has been sponsoring assaults on villages, the Sudanese Government has adopted a policy of promoting the return of displaced peoples to their communities. In furtherance of this policy, it has been aggressively attempting to persuade the displaced peoples of Darfur to return home by telling that them that the security situation has changed and that their villages are now safe. also heard reports of bribes being offered to village chiefs in exchange for telling their people to go back home.  In some instances, Sudanese officials have lured home displaced people -- many of whom have received little or no assistance in the camps -- with promises of a generous return package.  

For instance, the Government ferried approximately 100 hungry families to the village of Sania Dalaiba on July 12, the same day in which Janjaweed and government forces attacked the village of Donki Dereisa, just 40 miles further south.  The returnees informed that the Government had failed to make good on their promise of assistance and were very afraid for their safety -- with good reason. Other returnees have been killed, beaten, raped and/or threatened by roaming bands of Janjaweed.  

One reason why the displaced have been unwilling to accept the Government’s assurances is that the security situation is abysmal around the camps where they have sought sanctuary.  While there has been little violence in the camps themselves, camp residents have been the subject of frequent attacks when they have dared to venture out into the surrounding areas.  In particular, an alarming number of women have been assaulted and raped by Janjaweed fighters when they have left the camps to plant crops or gather firewood.  In one recent incident, four young women were abducted when they went to collect firewood outside the Otash camp in Nyala.  Women have been routinely raped while collecting firewood outside Kass camp; one recently died from her wounds after having been gang raped.  In another incident, a woman from the Nerti camp was gang raped by ten Janjaweed, who mutilated her breasts and genitals with a sword.  While Sudanese police have been deployed at some of the camps and villages where the displaced have fled, they have been unwilling to patrol the perimeters of the camps and, hence, have had no significant impact on the security situation.  To make matters worse, in at least some camps, the police have stopped taking reports of alleged rape and stopped giving victims a referral document so they can receive immediate medical attention.

Refugees International, therefore, recommends that:

• The Government of Sudan immediately cease participating in and sponsoring attacks against the civilian population of Darfur.
• The U.N. Security Council ensures that the Sudanese government adheres to the terms of its July 30 resolution and imposes sanctions in the event Khartoum fails to take concrete steps to disarm and otherwise rein in the Janjaweed militias by the August 30 deadline specified in that resolution.
• The United States, the European Union, and the African Union secure the Government’s commitment to the principle of voluntary repatriation and communicate to Khartoum in the strongest possible terms that any attempt to force IDPs to return to their villages will be met with serious consequences.
• The Government of Sudan provide real security to the displaced in their places of sanctuary and to those who have remained in or returned to their villages, including through active patrolling by police in the surrounding areas.
• Donor governments immediately disburse the funds necessary to support an expanded African Union cease-fire monitoring force of at least 3,000, which must be supplied with the logistical equipment necessary to fulfill its mission.  The AU monitors should be permitted to interview the displaced in private and outside the presence of combatants on either side.
• The Offices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Refugees immediately deploy a team of 12 human rights monitors and 12 protection officers respectively to Darfur.