01/26/2005

Contacts: Sarah Martin and Fidele Lumeya
ri@refugeesinternational.org or 202.828.0110

Although UN Security Council resolution 1509 mandated that specific attention be paid to child and women combatants in Liberia's disarmament programs, the planners of the disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation program (DDR) failed to design the program to account adequately for the needs of these combatants. The DDR program for former child combatants was characterized by fraud and time-consuming problems that should have been worked out in the planning stages. The decision to pay the former child combatants a cash stipend was especially problematic. Precious resources were wasted and now the DDR program has run out of funds needed to support rehabilitation programs.

In December 2003, the time of the initial attempt at disarmament, the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the transitional government of Liberia found themselves overwhelmed by a large turnout of combatants seeking to begin the disarmament process. The DDR authorities sought to calm the rioting by distributing the first payment of the expected US$300 to all combatants. However, no distinction was made between children, young adults under 18 and adults. Some of the former child soldiers received cash payments. When the disarmament program was resumed in April 2004, UNMIL claimed that if they did not pay the child combatants, whom they believed constituted 25% of the total, then the child combatants would not participate in the overall DDR program and would remain a threat to the security of Liberia. In addition, the commanders of the forces insisted that they must pay child combatants as some had received payments in December, which had created a precedent. But when commanders realized that any child showing up claiming to be a child combatant would be eligible to receive US$300, many began sending their own children and others who had not been involved in the fighting to the disarmament sites while excluding the real child combatants.

Child protection agencies initially fought the policy of payments to children but realized that they were going to take place whether or not child protection agencies were involved. In order to ensure that the children were not further victimized, protection agencies found themselves having to negotiate with the military structure of UNMIL to be included in the process and to divert time and money intended to help all war affected children into activities related to protecting children within the DDR program. "Here we were, a small NGO that works with children, fighting against the bureaucracy of a military organization to be involved in what is essentially a military exercise," complained one protection agency. "Do you think they respected our point of view?"

Military observers who were conducting the initial disarmament exercise did not want to work with NGOs. Child protection agencies asked to be involved in pre-screening child combatants. "The observers did not see the children as a true security threat, so working to identify child combatants was not a priority for them," said one agency. Another agency reaffirmed this perception saying, "The military was interested in getting weapons so they didn't screen the children hard." The military observers also received unclear guidance from planners about the definition of a child combatant, so the interpretation of who was a child affiliated with the fighting forces was wide and inconsistent from site to site. Fraud was rampant in the program. "In some places, you found five-year-old children walking into camps with a box of bullets being accepted for disarmament," said one agency. "Since you did not need to produce a weapon to be accepted into the program and the military observers had no training on screening, everyone was accepted."

Involving child protection agencies that employ Liberian social workers was an effective deterrent against fraud in the DDR process. At a meeting to discuss the successes and failures of the DDR program, it was noted that "[in cases] when the commanders saw how rigorous the screening process was for children, they decided not to use children to get extra money because it was too strict." However, as the DDR process rushed to a close in some of the rural counties during its third phase, there was even more pressure to get people in and out of the DDR cantonment sites resulting in still more abuse of the system.

Services designed to help children overcome the trauma experienced with war and to better integrate them into society were suspended or became useless due to the children's focus on receiving cash. "For most of these child combatants, the Interim Care Centre became a housing facility where they could wait for their money. The payments definitely discouraged them from engaging more fully in the activities we were trying to involve them in," said one social worker. While not all children were exploited and some used their money to give to their families, child protection agencies reported several cases in which former combatants were exploited by their commanders for this money. "The command structure is still very strong in some areas," reported one agency, "particularly around Monrovia and in Nimba County. We have had reports of commanders still visiting the children and threatening the population."

In December, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said in a report to the Security Council that Liberia urgently needed $60 million to cover shortfalls in the program to rehabilitate more than 100,000 former combatants who registered for disarmament. Adult combatants who were trying to attend schools have been expelled due to a failure of the disarmament commission to pay their school fees. "We are able to break the chains of command when the children go home but they are not going home. They are staying in Monrovia," says one agency. The child combatants stay in Monrovia because there they can engage in petty trade. With few programs to help reintegrate these stigmatized children back into their communities, there is a concern that they will never return to their communities and overcome their trauma. Child protection agencies have reported young female combatants returning to DDR cantonment sites to sell themselves as prostitutes since there are no other opportunities for them. "These children did a lot of terrible things," said a community member that RI interviewed. "Giving them money is like paying them for the havoc they created. Why should they be rewarded when we have nothing?"

Therefore, Refugees International recommends that:

• Child protection agencies be actively involved in all DDR programs in pre-screening child combatants to determine their eligibility for the process, thereby ensuring that the most vulnerable are targeted.
• Military observers receive guidance and training in how to screen and work with child combatants.
• DDR programs include female military observers or female staff of the disarmament program to assist with young female combatants.
• DDR programs not provide cash payments as incentives for child combatants to disarm.
• Donors make more money available for reintegration programs.