08/15/2006

The following letter was sent to officials with the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on August 10, 2006. The letter details Refugee International's concerns related to security, demobilization programs, and security sector reform in sites visited during the recent RI mission to the country. RI sent the letter after an official with the UN peacekeeping force there responded to our recent bulletin on demobilization activities for girls associated with armed forces in the DRC.

August 10, 2006
Washington, D.C.

Thank you very much for your recent attention to the issue of girls associated with armed forces in the DRC. Your initiatives will help to ensure that the thousands of girls caught up with armed groups in the DRC get the help they need to have safer and more stable lives.

Our recent mission to the DRC also uncovered several other issues related to the DDR [disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration] process and security sector reform, where increased attention now could have a substantial impact on the lives of those involved.

In the Central Katanga village of Mitwaba, we found conditions much improved over those during our previous visit, in February 2006. Largely due to the intervention of MONUC [the UN peacekeeping mission to the DRC], the 63rd Brigade is no longer a threat to civilians, Mai-Mai combatants [local defense forces] are presenting themselves for disarmament, and IDPs [internally displaced persons] are ready to go home. For the former Mai-Mai combatants, however, the situation is not easy. After taking the risk to disarm, they have languished in the Mitwaba transit camp for more than two months. They receive irregular and insufficient food rations, and CONADER [the Congolese governmental agency overseeing the DDR process] has not been able to supply them with return kits and transport stipends as promised. They are forced to share their food rations with their families, who are not covered by any assistance plan offered by humanitarian agencies. While there may be logistical or security concerns that prevent the timely release of the ex-combatants from the transit center, they must receive adequate and regular food rations for themselves and their families.

The issue of return, however, is also crucial for the ex-combatants and their families as well as the thousands of IDPs in Mitwaba. Some IDPs in other sites, such as Sampwe, have already returned home, but those in Mitwaba are stymied by the continued presence of unintegrated government troops to the east. These troops have been called in to their headquarters at Pweto, but they and their families are not moving quickly enough. Time is of the essence: IDPs and ex-combatants must return home to prepare their fields this month before the rains come in September. IDPs told us that they will not wait for assistance: once they get word that the soldiers are gone, they will go back by themselves, and hope that assistance in the form of seeds and tools, as well as help for education and health care, will follow. In the meantime, the military authorities in Pweto should receive all the assistance they need to bring their troops in for integration as quickly as possible.

In North Kivu, the Refugees International team visited the villages of Rubare and Kiwanja near Rutshuru as well as Erengeti in the Grand Nord [the northern part of North Kivu Province]. In Rubare, IDPs reported that the newly arrived Ninth Integrated Brigade steals goods and rapes women, in contrast to the Second Integrated Brigade, which is also deployed in the area. They do not report these abuses out of mistrust of the local authorities - and indeed, a village chief in Rubare claimed that the IDPs were lying when told of the alleged abuses. He also defended the lack of assistance given to the IDPs, some of whom have been in Rubare for four years, by saying that his assistants had not managed to register them.

Regarding foreign armed groups, creative approaches to disarmament and durable solutions may help decrease the need for military intervention in the Kivus and the resulting humanitarian consequences. According to reports from the field, 60% of the troops in the ADF/NALU [a rebel group fighting against the Ugandan government] in the Grand Nord are Congolese; while Uganda has promised amnesty for Ugandans in the group, a specific DDR effort for the Congolese might reduce the group's strength substantially. For the FDLR [a Rwandan rebel group, part of which is made up of those responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide], fighters need safe passage from their bases through FARDC [the Congolese national army] lines to disarmament sites, and the deployment of MONUC Mobile Operating Bases near FDLR areas may help.

Finally, in Ituri, we noticed similar problems regarding DDR and the FARDC as we found in other regions. After repeated massacres, fighting, and displacement over the past several years, Djugu Territory is now largely calm. However, people are still fleeing FARDC abuses around Nioka; when asked why they chose the village of Buba, near Rethy, as a refuge, the IDPs said that it was the first place they came upon that did not have any FARDC. The FARDC major in charge at Nioka is in fact well known for causing problems. A few days before our visit, he and his men traveled south to Kpandroma, broke down the barrier at the entrance to the town, and looted shops in the area. In terms of DDR, CONADER seems unable to cope with the influx from the extended call for voluntary disarmament: ex-combatants were left waiting in the streets during our visit, abandoned by their commanders with no help forthcoming from the government.

One obstacle to an effective response in Ituri was the poor coordination we witnessed between MONUC and the humanitarian community. During regular security briefings, the MONUC brigade representative announced that the brigade commander refused to meet with humanitarian agencies, and that he himself would only participate in the briefings as long as no questions were asked. Humanitarian response in the area is extremely difficult, and agencies need as much security information as they can get. MONUC has a particular role to play in providing that information, and it must improve its relations with the humanitarian community in Bunia. To achieve that goal, MONUC may want to consider a system of confidential as well as open briefings, in which the FARDC should also be involved.

Looking at DDR and security-sector reform more broadly, beyond specific geographic areas, it seems clear that the process is still in only its early stages. In particular, current achievements in army integration and durable solutions for ex-combatants should be regarded as only the first phase. More training, evaluation, and recruitment is needed to achieve well-integrated brigades in the FARDC, and more training, public works programs, and early community recovery projects are needed to achieve more comprehensive reintegration of ex-combatants. The time to lay the groundwork for the new phases of integration and reintegration is now.

To summarize, Refugees International recommends that:

• CONADER and the MDRP [the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, coordinated by the World Bank] ensure that ex-combatants in transit centers receive enough food for themselves and their families at regular intervals, and that they are released as soon as possible from the centers with the full complement of assistance.
• MONUC and the MDRP provide all necessary assistance to the military authorities in Pweto in bringing unintegrated government troops and their families in for integration with the FARDC, so that IDPs in Mitwaba can return home in time to prepare their fields for planting.
• The FARDC take steps immediately to end abuses by the Ninth Integrated Brigade near Rutshuru and by government troops based in Nioka.
• MONUC and the MDRP consider a DDR program specifically for Congolese members of the ADF/NALU, similar to the DCR [demobilization and community reintegration] program developed in Ituri, as well as the deployment of Mobile Operating Bases to facilitate the disarmament and return of fighters associated with the FDLR.
• MONUC ensure that its military forces coordinate fully and professionally with the humanitarian community in Ituri, perhaps through confidential as well as open briefings, and in conjunction with the FARDC.
• MONUC, the MDRP, and donor governments prepare for new phases of both army integration and ex-combatant reintegration, to start as soon as possible.