In 2005, after over two decades of civil war, the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). But devastated infrastructure, a fragile security environment, political mistrust, ethno-tribal tensions, and friction over possession of oil-producing areas have meant that many of the reforms provided for in the CPA have been slow to materialize.

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established in March 2005 with a mandate to monitor, verify and support the implementation of the CPA. The UNMIS political and military components are specifically responsible for holding the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan and their respective military components, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA, to their commitments.

The responsibility for the success or failure of the CPA ultimately lies with the signatories themselves, and no amount of international funding or technical assistance will overcome a lack of domestic political will. The CPA is designed to be a roadmap, guiding the former warring parties through a census in 2007, elections in 2009, and finally to a 2011 referendum on southern independence. Advancing this process relies heavily on the stabilization of security in the south through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of surplus government and SPLA troops and on the creation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), intended to be the core of a new, unified Sudanese military.

The best way for the parties to the agreement to demonstrate their commitment to peace would be to provide the necessary resources to develop and implement the disarmament plan. But the disarmament and demobilization process is currently at a standstill as the Northern and Southern DDR commissions have yet to even agree to a common set of procedures.

The Joint Integrated Units are also facing serious difficulties. The 39,000 strong force is meant to be comprised of composite units of SAF and SPLA. In 2007, two years after the signing of the CPA, at a time when UNMIS forces were slated to start to disengage, the JIUs, while just over 80% deployed, are ‘integrated’ in name only, with the two sides maintaining split allegiances and parallel command and control structures.

Assuming that the JIUs are likely to be dissolved in 2011 when the south is expected to vote in favor of independence, neither party to the CPA has showed any real commitment to the creation or integration of these units, with the possible exception of those in strategic or oil producing areas. Even the composition of some of the JIUs is questionable, as former members of “Other Armed Groups,” a loose assortment of militia groups from various tribal backgrounds aligned with, but not strictly a part of either the SAF or the SPLA, are being added to JIUs in areas where they have a history of committing abuses against rival tribal groups. This is giving rise to increased tension and mistrust between the JIUs and the local people that they are meant to protect.

Police forces do exist in the south, and some procedural reforms are underway, with the support of the UNMIS Civilian Police and bilateral donors such as the United States. But after decades of conflict in which police were more often identified as an enemy of the south Sudanese people than as a security service, basic law enforcement continues to be exceptionally weak and inconsistent. The Government of South Sudan has had some difficulty paying its public servants, resulting in malpractices and illegal fines becoming a feature of policing in the south. Meanwhile, important traditional authority structures responsible for the implementation of justice have been undermined by the war and in some cases completely abandoned as traditional chiefs and elders were killed or forced to flee the violence.

The lack of formal security structures is particularly worrying as a result of the huge surplus of automatic weapons available in the region. Officials interviewed by Refugees International described a situation in which armed nomad groups guard their livestock with AK-47s and attack their rivals employing military tactics acquired during the war. Banditry, violent cattle raids, theft of children, and inter-tribal conflicts persist as a backdrop to the ongoing North-South tensions, particularly around the contested border areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile states. With the security situation unstable and disarmament at a standstill, people are understandably unwilling to give up weapons that are their sole means to defend themselves and their families.

UNMIS faces a Herculean task, given the logistical challenges of ‘monitoring’ a country the size of western Europe, with very few paved roads and airstrips, poor to non-existent telecommunications systems, serious land mines hazards and extreme weather conditions. In addition to this monitoring role, UNMIS was given a multidimensional mandate, meaning that the Mission is tasked with all elements of the UN response in Sudan, engaging closely with UN humanitarian, development, and human rights agencies in addition to the more traditional peacekeeping role. With a multidimensional mandate, the political head of the Mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), is supposed to be a source of political strength and strategic vision for every aspect of the UN response. Given the critical importance of this post, it is inexcusable that it has been vacant since October 2006. Lacking in senior leadership, and suffering from the additional pressure created by the high profile and politically sensitive conflict in Darfur, the existing UNMIS management and staff are being stretched beyond reasonable limits.

UNMIS does not have the mandate to cope effectively with the prevailing non-military insecurity in the south. UNMIS has been given a mandate to protect civilians under “imminent threat of violence” (primarily military violence), but they have not been enabled to intervene in matters of law and order. Peacekeepers can not take the place of the weak policing system, and as such they are ill-equipped to address the inter-tribal violence and criminal activity that makes up the bulk of the insecurity in the south.

The news from southern Sudan is not entirely grim. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people are returning to the south after years --- and sometimes decades --- in exile, and communities are welcoming them back, in spite of the strain that this has placed on southern Sudan’s meager services and resources. The momentum that has propelled people to return must not be allowed to be squandered, and in the absence of basic security, ambitious plans for political and economic progress are doomed to fail.


Senior Advocate Andrea Lari and Peacebuilding Associate Erin Weir assessed the humanitarian and security situation in southern Sudan in June.