The dialogue is changing. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and his deputy Scot Marceil visited Burma and held talks with Burmese officials and Burmese dissident Aung San Suu Kyi. It is the highest-level visit to Burma in more than a decade, and follows the State Department’s
September announcement of its Burma Policy Review , which began shortly after President Obama took office.
Though the rest of the U.S. review largely endorses existing policy, this is a notable opening of dialogue with the Burmese government. It is also representative of a notable change in the debate around all things Burma – including humanitarian assistance.
When Refugees International began a strong push to get the US engaged on humanitarian issues in January 2008, we were the only Washington-based voice doing so. A number of international aid agencies and think tanks actively told us that they had abandoned similar efforts because of the vehement opposition they had faced. Government officials told us it was a nice idea, but that it was impossible in the current policy context. And some human rights organizations openly attacked RI and its staff for taking such a “naïve” position.
The Obama Administration’s review has solidly endorsed the idea of providing humanitarian assistance inside Burma. Many of those who were opposed to RI’s work on this issue two years ago now are not just publicly endorsing this position, but are themselves calling for aid to Burma. Though this is a significant shift in where the debate is being held, what is more important is that it also signals a shift in the substance of the debate.
Two years ago,
Refugees International found a landscape where those interested in increasing dialogue and interaction with Burma were generally seen as junta sympathizers, apologists, or simply naïve because of their convictions. This antagonistic polarization has disappeared, and been replaced with a playing field that increasingly shares the same analysis of the difficulties of working in Burma, and the possible opportunities for promoting more openness inside the country. As a result, policy discussions are focused less on trying to tear down each other’s arguments, and more on working with and through each other’s analyses to create the greatest possibility for a successful US policy towards Burma.
So what led to these changes?
First and foremost, the interaction that came out of the tragedy caused by Cyclone Nargis. Cyclone Nargis provided policymakers the
first real exposure to working with civil society and humanitarian organizations on the ground – an experience which quickly dispelled many of the fears and misperceptions about what types of work are possible to conduct successfully on the ground. Second, individuals and organizations working inside the country lost much of their fears about speaking out about the needs inside the country, which not only opened the eyes of people in Washington, but also provided credible voices from the field for the first time.
Finally, interaction between policymakers, human rights activists and think tanks with Burmese civil society and humanitarian workers dramatically increased – largely through visits to Washington – and built the confidence needed on both sides to move the agenda forward.
In the end, the outlook for serious change in Burma is still bleak. But the fact that the dialogue around Burma has moved to a discussion of facts and increasingly sophisticated analysis will give the Obama administration the best chances at success in moving forward.